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Abstract
Let V be a multiset of n points in Rd, which we call voters, and let k > 1 and ` > 1 be two
given constants. We consider the following game, where two players P and Q compete over the
voters in V : First, player P selects k points in Rd, and then player Q selects ` points in Rd.
Player P wins a voter v ∈ V iff dist(v, P ) 6 dist(v,Q), where dist(v, P ) := minp∈P dist(v, p) and
dist(v,Q) is defined similarly. Player P wins the game if he wins at least half the voters. The
algorithmic problem we study is the following: given V , k, and `, how efficiently can we decide if
player P has a winning strategy, that is, if P can select his k points such that he wins the game
no matter where Q places her points.
Banik et al. devised a singly-exponential algorithm for the game in R1, for the case k = `.
We improve their result by presenting the first polynomial-time algorithm for the game in R1.
Our algorithm can handle arbitrary values of k and `. We also show that if d ≥ 2, deciding if
player P has a winning strategy is ΣP2 -hard when k and ` are part of the input. Finally, we
prove that for any dimension d, the problem is contained in the complexity class ∃∀R, and we
give an algorithm that works in polynomial time for fixed k and `.
1 Introduction
Voronoi games, as introduced by Ahn et al. [1], can be viewed as competitive facility-location
problems in which two players P and Q want to place their facilities in order to maximize their
market area. The Voronoi game of Ahn et al. is played in a bounded region R ⊂ R2, and the facilities
of the players are modeled as points in this region. Each player gets the same number, k, of facilities,
which they have to place alternatingly. The market area of P (and similarly of Q) is now given by
the area of the region of all points q ∈ R whose closest facility was placed by P, that is, it is the
total area of the Voronoi cells of P’s facilities in the Voronoi diagram of the facilities of P and Q.
Ahn et al. proved that for k > 1 and when the region R is a circle or a segment, the second player
can win the game by a payoff of 1/2 + ε, for some ε > 0, where the first player can ensure ε is
arbitrarily small.
The one-round Voronoi game introduced by Cheong et al. [8] is similar to the Voronoi game of
Ahn et al., except that the first player must first place all his k facilities, after which the second
player places all her k facilities. They considered the problem where R is a square, and they showed
that when k is large enough the first player can always win a fraction 1/2 + α of the area of R for
some α > 0. Fekete and Meijer [11] considered the problem on a rectangle R of aspect ratio ρ 6 1.
They showed that the first player wins more than half the area of R, unless k > 3 and ρ >
√
2/n,
or k = 2 and ρ >
√
3/2. They also showed that if R is a polygon with holes, then computing the
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locations of the facilities for the second player that maximize the area she wins, against a given set
of facilities of the first player is NP-hard.
One-round discrete Voronoi games. In this paper we are interested in discrete (Euclidean)
one-round Voronoi games, where the players do not compete for area but for a discrete set of points.
That is, instead of the region R one is given a set V of n points in a geometric space, and a point
v ∈ V is won by the player owning the facility closest to v. (Another discrete variant of Voronoi
games is played on graphs [17, 19] but we restrict our attention to the geometric variant.) More
formally, the problem we study is defined as follows.
Let V be a multiset of n points in Rd, which we call voters from now on, and let k > 1 and ` > 1
be two integers. The one-round discrete Voronoi game defined by the triple 〈V, k, `〉 is a single-turn
game played between two players P and Q. First, player P places a set P of k points in Rd, then
player Q places a set Q of ` points in Rd. (These points may coincide with the voters in V .) We
call the set P the strategy of P and the set Q the strategy of Q. Player P wins a voter v ∈ V if
dist(v, P ) 6 dist(v,Q), where dist(v, P ) and dist(v,Q) denote the minimum distance between a
voter v and the sets P and Q, respectively. Note that this definition favors player P , since in case of
a tie a voter is won by P. We now define V [P  Q] := {v ∈ V : dist(v, P ) 6 dist(v,Q)} to be the
multiset of voters won by player P when he uses strategy P and player Q uses strategy Q. Player
P wins the game 〈V, k, `〉 if he wins at least half the voters in V , that is, when ∣∣V [P  Q]∣∣ > n/2;
otherwise Q wins the game. Here ∣∣V [P  Q]∣∣ denotes the size of the multiset V [P  Q] (counting
multiplicities). We now define Γk,`(V ) as the maximum number of voters that can be won by player
P against an optimal opponent:
Γk,`(V ) := max
P⊂Rd, |P |=k
min
Q⊂Rd, |Q|=`
∣∣V [P  Q]∣∣.
For a given multiset V of voters, we want to decide if1 Γk,`(V ) > n/2. In other words, we are
interested in determining for a given game 〈V, k, `〉 if P has a winning strategy, which is a set of k
points such that P wins the game no matter where Q places her points.
An important special case, which has already been studied in spatial voting theory for a long
time, is when k = ` = 1 [14]. Here the coordinates of a point in V represent the preference of the
voter on certain topics, and the point played by Q represents a certain proposal. If the point played
by P wins against all possible points played by Q, then the P’s proposal will win the vote against
any other proposal. Note that in the problem definition we gave above, voters at equal distance
from P and Q are won by P , and P has to win at least half the voters. This is the definition typically
used in papers of Voronoi games [3, 4, 5, 6]. In voting theory other variants are studied as well, for
instance where points at equal distance to P and Q are not won by either of them, and P wins the
game if he wins more voters than Q; see the paper by McKelvey and Wendell [14] who use the term
majority points for the former variant and the term plurality points for the latter variant.
Previous work. Besides algorithmic problems concerning the one-round discrete Voronoi game
one can also consider combinatorial problems. In particular, one can ask for bounds on Γk,`(V )
as a function of n, k, and `. It is known that for any set V in R2 and k = ` = 1 we have
bn/3c 6 Γ1,1(V ) 6 dn/2e. This result is based on known bounds for maximum Tukey depth, where
the lower bound can be proven using Helly’s theorem. It is also known [6] that there is a constant c
such that k = c` points suffice for P to win the game, that is, Γc`,`(V ) > n/2 for any V .
In this paper we focus on the algorithmic problem of computing Γk,`(V ) for given V , k, and `.
The problem of deciding if Γk,`(V ) > n/2 was studied for the case k = ` = 1 by Wu et al. [20] and
1One can also require that Γk,`(V ) > n/2; with some small modifications, all the results in this paper can be
applied to the case with strict inequality as well.
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Lin et al. [13], and later by De Berg et al. [9] who solve this problem in O(n log n) time in any
fixed dimension d. Their algorithms works when V is a set (not a multiset) and for plurality points
instead of majority points. Other algorithmic results are for the setting where the players already
placed all but one of their points, and one wants to compute the best locations for the last point
of P and of Q. Banik et al. [5] gave algorithms that finds the best location for P in O(n8) time
and for Q in O(n2) time. For the two-round variant of the problem, with k = ` = 2, polynomial
algorithms for finding the optimal strategies of both players are also known [4].
Our work is inspired by the paper of Banik et al. [3] on computing Γk,`(V ) in R1. They considered
the case of arbitrarily large k and `, but where k = ` (and V is a set instead of a multiset). For this
case they showed that depending on the set V either P or Q can win the game, and they presented
an algorithm to compute Γk,`(V ) in time O(nk−λk), where 0 < λk < 1 is a constant dependent only
on k. This raises the question: is the problem NP-hard when k is part of the input?
Our results. We answer the question above negatively, by presenting an algorithm that computes
Γk,`(V ) in R1 in polynomial time. Our algorithm works when V is a multiset, and it does not require
k and ` to be equal. Our algorithm computes Γk,`(V ) and finds a strategy for P that wins this many
voters in time O(kn4). The algorithm can be extended to the case when the voters are weighted,
requiring only a slight increase in running time.
The algorithm by Banik et al. [3] discretizes the problem, by defining a finite set of potential
locations for P to place his points. However, to ensure an optimal strategy for P , the set of potential
locations has exponential size. To overcome this problem we need several new ideas. First of
all, we essentially partition the possible strategies into various classes—the concept of thresholds
introduced later plays this role—such that for each class we can anticipate the behavior of the
optimal strategy for Q. To compute the best strategy within a certain class we use dynamic
programming, in a non-standard (and, unfortunately, rather complicated) way. The subproblems
in our dynamic-program are for smaller point sets and smaller values of k and ` (actually we will
need several other parameters) where the goal of P will be to push his rightmost point as far to
the right as possible to win a certain number of points. One complication in the dynamic program
is that it is unclear which small subproblems I ′ can be used to solve a given subproblem I. The
opposite direction—determining for I ′ which larger subproblems I may use I ′ in their solution—is
easier however, so we use a sweep approach: when the solution to some I ′ has been determined, we
update the solution to larger subproblems I that can use I ′.
After establishing that we can compute Γk,`(V ) in polynomial time in R1, we turn to the
higher-dimensional problem. We show that deciding if P has a winning strategy is ΣP2 -hard in R2.
We also show that for fixed k and ` this problem can be solved in polynomial time. Our solution
combines algebraic methods [7] with a result of Paterson and Zwick [15] that one can construct a
polynomial-size boolean circuits that implements the majority function. The latter result in essential
to avoid the appearance of n in the exponent. As a byproduct of the algebraic method, we show
that the problem is contained in the complexity class ∃∀R; see [10] for more information on this
complexity class.
2 A polynomial-time algorithm for d = 1
In this section we present a polynomial-time algorithm for the 1-dimensional discrete Voronoi game.
Our algorithm will employ dynamic programming, and it will be convenient to use n, k, and ` as
variables in the dynamic program. From now on, we therefore use n∗ for the size of the original
multiset V , and k∗ and `∗ for the initial number of points that can be played by P and Q, respectively.
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2.1 Notation and basic properties
We denote the given multiset of voters by V := {v1, . . . , vn∗}, where we assume the voters are
numbered from left to right. We also always number the points in the strategies P := {p1, . . . , pk∗}
and Q := {q1, . . . , q`∗} from left to right. For brevity we make no distinction between a point and
its value (that is, its x-coordinate), so that we can for example write p1 < q1 to indicate that the
leftmost point of P is located to the left of the leftmost point of Q.
For a given game 〈V, k, `〉, we say that a strategy P of player P realizes a gain γ if ∣∣V [P  Q]∣∣ > γ
for any strategy Q of player Q. Furthermore, we say that a strategy P is optimal if it realizes Γk,`(V ),
the maximum possible gain for P, and we say a strategy Q is optimal against a given strategy P if∣∣V [P  Q]∣∣ 6 ∣∣V [P  Q′]∣∣ for any strategy Q′.
Trivial, reasonable, and canonical strategies for P. For 0 6 n 6 n∗, define Vn := {v1, . . . , vn}
to be the leftmost n points in V . Suppose we want to compute Γk,`(Vn) for some 1 6 k 6 n and
0 6 ` 6 n. The trivial strategy of player P is to place his points at the k points of Vn with the highest
multiplicities—here we consider the multiset Vn as a set of distinct points, each with a multiplicity
corresponding to the number of times it occurs in Vn—with ties broken arbitrarily. Let ‖Vn‖ denote
the number of distinct points in Vn. Then the trivial strategy is optimal when k > ‖Vn‖ and also
when ` > 2k: in the former case P wins all voters with the trivial strategy, and in the latter case
Q can always win all voters not coinciding with a point in P (namely by surrounding each point
pi ∈ P by two points sufficiently close to pi) so the trivial strategy is optimal for P. Hence, from
now on we consider subproblems with k < ‖Vn‖ and ` < 2k.
We can without loss of generality restrict our attention to strategies for P that place at most one
point in each half-open interval of the form (vi, vi+1] with vi 6= vi+1, where 0 6 i 6 n, v0 := −∞,
and vn∗+1 := ∞. Indeed, placing more than two points inside an interval (vi, vi+1] is clearly not
useful, and if two points are placed in some interval (vi, vi+1] then we can always move the leftmost
point onto vi. (If vi is already occupied by a point in P , then we can just put the point on any
unoccupied voter; under our assumption that k < ‖Vn‖ an unoccupied voter always exists.) We will
call a strategy for P satisfying the property above reasonable.
Observation 1 (Banik et al. [3]). Assuming k < ‖Vn‖ there exist an optimal strategy for P that is
reasonable and has p1 ∈ V (that is, p1 coincides with a voter).
We can define an ordering on strategies of the same size by sorting them in lexicographical order.
More precisely, we say that a strategy P = {p1, . . . , pk} is greater than a strategy P ′ = {p′1, . . . , p′k},
denoted by P  P ′, if 〈p1, . . . , pk〉 >lex 〈p′1, . . . , p′k〉, where >lex denotes the lexicographical order.
Using this ordering, the largest reasonable strategy P that is optimal—namely, that realizes Γk,`(Vn)—
is called the canonical strategy of P.
α-gains, β-gains, and gain sequences. Consider a strategy P := {p1, . . . , pk}. It will be
convenient to add two extra points to P , namely p0 := −∞ and pk+1 := ∞; this clearly does not
influence the outcome of the game. The strategy P thus induces k + 1 open intervals of the form
(pi, pi+1) where player Q may place her points. It is easy to see that there exists an optimal strategy
for Q with the following property: Q contains at most two points in each interval (pi, pi+1) with
1 6 i 6 k − 1, and at most one point in (p0, p1) and at most one point in (pk, pk+1). From now on
we restrict our attention to strategies for Q with this property.
Now suppose that x and y are consecutive points (with x < y) in some strategy P , where x could
be −∞ and y could be ∞. As just argued, Q either places zero, one, or two points inside (x, y).
When Q places zero points, then she obviously does not win any of the voters in Vn ∩ (x, y). The
maximum number of voters Q can win from Vn ∩ (x, y) by placing a single point is the maximum
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number of voters in (x, y) that can be covered by an open interval of length (y − x)/2; see Banik et
al. [3]. We call this value the α-gain of Q in (x, y) and denote it by gainα(Vn, x, y). By placing two
points inside (x, y), one immediately to the right of x and one immediately to the left of y, player Q
will win all voters Vn ∩ (x, y). Thus the extra number of voters won by the second point in (x, y)
as compared to just placing a single point is equal to |Vn ∩ (x, y)| − gainα(Vn, x, y). We call this
quantity the β-gain of Q in (x, y) and denote it by gainβ(Vn, x, y). Note that for intervals (x,∞) we
have gainα(x,∞) = |Vn ∩ (x,∞)| and gainβ(x,∞) = 0; a similar statement holds for (−∞, y).
The following observation follows from the fact that gainα(Vn, x, y) equals the maximum number
of voters in (x, y) that can be covered by an open interval of length (y − x)/2.
Observation 2 (Banik et al. [3]). For any x, y we have gainα(Vn, x, y) > gainβ(Vn, x, y).
If we let a := gainα(Vn, x, y) and b := gainβ(Vn, x, y), then player Q wins either 0, a, or a + b
points depending on whether she plays 0, 1, or 2 points inside the interval. It will therefore be
convenient to introduce the notation ⊕j for j ∈ {0, 1, 2}, which is defined as
a⊕0 b := 0, a⊕1 b := a, a⊕2 b := a+ b.
We assume the precedence of these operators are higher than addition.
Let P := {p0, p1, . . . , pk, pk+1} be a given strategy for P, where by convention p0 = −∞ and
pk+1 =∞. Consider {gainα(Vn, pi, pi+1) : 0 6 i 6 k}∪ {gainβ(Vn, pi, pi+1) : 0 6 i 6 k}, the multiset
of all α-gains and β-gains defined by the intervals (pi, pi + 1). Sort this sequence in non-increasing
order, using the following tie-breaking rules if two gains are equal:
• if one of the gains is for an interval (pi, pi+1)—that is, the gain is either gainα(Vn, pi, pi+1) or
gainβ(Vn, pi, pi+1)—and the other gain is for an interval (pj , pj+1) with j > i, then the gain
for (pi, pi+1) precedes the gain for (pj , pj+1).
• if both gains are for the same interval (pi, pi+1) then the α-gain precedes the β-gain.
We call the resulting sorted sequence the gain sequence induced by P on Vn. We denote this sequence
by Σgain(Vn, P ) or, when P and Vn are clear from the context, sometimes simply by Σgain.
The canonical strategy of Q and sequence representations. Given the multiset Vn, a strategy
P and value `, player Q can compute an optimal strategy as follows. First she computes the gain
sequence Σgain(Vn, P ) and chooses the first ` gains in Σgain(Vn, P ). Then for each 0 6 i 6 k she
proceeds as follows. When gainα(Vn, pi, pi+1) and gainβ(Vn, pi, pi+1) are both chosen, she places two
points in (pi, pi+1) that win all voters in (pi, pi+1); when only gainα(Vn, pi, pi+1) is chosen, she places
one point in (pi, pi+1) that win gainα(Vn, pi, pi+1) voters. (By Observation 2 and the tie-breaking
rules, when gainβ(Vn, pi, pi+1) is chosen it is always the case that gainα(Vn, pi, pi+1) is also chosen.)
The resulting optimal strategy Q is called the canonical strategy of Q with ` points against P on Vn.
From now one we restrict the strategies of player Q to canonical strategies. In an optimal strategy,
player Q places at most two points in any interval induced by a strategy P = {p0, . . . , pk+1}, and
when we know that Q places a single point (and similarly when she places two points) then we also
know where to place the point(s). Hence, we can represent an optimal strategy Q, for given Vn and
P , by a sequence M(V, P,Q) := 〈m0, . . . ,mk〉 where mi ∈ {0, 1, 2} indicates how many points Q
plays in the interval (pi, pi+1). We call M(V, P,Q) the sequence representation of the strategy Q
against P on Vn. We denote the sequence representation of the canonical strategy of Q with ` points
against P on Vn by M(V, P, `). We have the following observation.
Observation 3. The canonical strategy of Q with ` points against P is the optimal strategy Q with
` points against P whose sequence representation is maximal in the lexicographical order.
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2.2 The subproblems for a dynamic-programming solution
For clarity, in the rest of Section 2 we assume the multiset of voters V does not have repetitive
entries, i.e we have a set of voters, and not a multiset. While all the results are easily extendible to
multisets, dealing with them adds unnecessary complexity to the text.
Our goal is to develop a dynamic-programming algorithm to compute Γk∗,`∗(V ). Before we can
define the subproblems on which the dynamic program is based, we need to introduce the concept of
thresholds, which is a crucial ingredient in the subproblems.
Strict and loose thresholds. Consider an arbitrary gain sequence Σgain(Vn, P ) = 〈τ1, . . . , τ2k+2〉.
Recall that each τi is the α-gain or β-gain of some interval (pi, pi+1), and that these gains are sorted
in non-increasing order. We call any integer value τ ∈ [τ`+1, τ`] an `-threshold for Q induced by P on
Vn, or simply a threshold if ` is clear from the context. We implicitly assume τ0 := n so that talking
about 0-threshold is also meaningful. Note that when τ` > τ > τ`+1 then the canonical strategy
for Q chooses all gains larger than τ and no gains smaller or equal to τ . Hence, we call τ a strict
threshold if τ` > τ > τ`+1. On the other hand, when τ = τ`+1 then gains of value τ may or may not
be chosen by the canonical strategy of Q. (Note that in this case for gains of value τ to be picked,
we would actually need τ` = τ = τ`+1.) In this case we call τ a loose threshold.
The idea will be to guess the threshold τ in an optimal solution and then use the fact that fixing
the threshold τ helps us to limit the strategies for P and anticipate the behavior of Q. Let Popt be
the canonical strategy realizing Γk∗,`∗(V ). We call any `∗-threshold of Popt an optimal threshold. We
devise an algorithm that gets a value τ as input and computes Γk∗,`∗(V ) correctly if τ is an optimal
threshold, and computes a value not greater than Γk∗,`∗(V ), otherwise.
Clearly we only need to consider values of τ that are at most n∗. In fact, since each α-gain or
β-gain in a given gain sequence corresponds to a unique subset of voters, the `∗-th largest gain can
be at most n∗/`∗, so we only need to consider τ -values up to bn∗/`∗c. Observe that when there
exists an optimal strategy that induces an `∗-threshold equal to zero, then Q can win all voters not
explicitly covered by P . In this case the trivial strategy is optimal for P. Our global algorithm is
now as follows.
1. For all thresholds τ ∈ {1, . . . , bn∗/`∗c}, compute an upper bound on the number of voters
P can win with a strategy that has an `∗-threshold τ . For the run where τ is an optimal
threshold, the algorithm will return Γk∗,`∗(V ).
2. Compute the number of voters P wins in the game 〈V, k∗, `∗〉 by the trivial strategy.
3. Report the best of all solutions found.
The subproblems for a fixed threshold τ . From now on we consider a fixed threshold value τ ∈
{1, . . . , bn∗/`∗c}. The subproblems in our dynamic-programming algorithm for the game 〈V, k∗, `∗〉
have several parameters.
• A parameter n ∈ {0, . . . , n∗}, specifying that the subproblem is on the voter set Vn.
• Parameters k, ` ∈ {0, . . . , n}, specifying that P can use k + 1 points and Q can use ` points.
• A parameter γ ∈ {0, . . . , n}, specifying the number of voters P must win.
• A parameter δ ∈ {strict, loose}, specifying the strictness of the fixed `-threshold τ .
Intuitively, the subproblem specified by a tuple 〈n, k, `, γ, δ〉 asks for a strategy P where P wins
at least γ voters from Vn and such that P that induces an `-threshold of strictness δ, against an
opponent Q using ` points. Player P may use k + 1 points and his objective will be to push his last
point, pk+1 as far to the right as possible. The value of the solution to such a subproblem, which we
denote by Xmax(n, k, `, γ, δ), will indicate how far to the right we can push pk+1. Ultimately we will
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be interested in solutions where P can push pk∗+1 all the way to +∞, which means he can actually
win γ voters by placing only k∗ points.
To formally define Xmax(n, k, `, γ, δ), we need one final piece of notation. Let x ∈ R∪ {−∞}, let
n ∈ {1, . . . , n∗}, and let a, b be integers. For convenience, define vn∗+1 := ∞. Now we define the
(a, b)-span of x to vn+1, denoted by span(x, n, a, b), as
span(x, n, a, b) :=
the maximum real value y ∈ (vn, vn+1] such
that gainα(V, x, y) = a and gainβ(V, x, y) = b
if x 6= −∞ and y exists
−∞ otherwise
Definition 4. For parameters n ∈ {0, . . . , n∗}, k, `, γ ∈ {0, . . . , n}, and δ ∈ {strict, loose}, we define
the value Xmax(n, k, `, γ, δ) and what it means when a strategy P realizes this value, as follows.
• For k = 0, we call it an elementary subproblem, and define Xmax(n, k, `, γ, δ) = vn+1 if
1. {vn+1} wins at least γ voters from Vn, and
2. {vn+1} induces an `-threshold τ with strictness δ on Vn,
and we define Xmax(n, k, `, γ, δ) = −∞ otherwise. In the former case we say that P := {vn+1}
realizes Xmax(n, k, `, γ, δ).
• For k > 0, we call it a non-elementary subproblem, and Xmax(n, k, `, γ, δ) is defined to be
equal to the maximum real value y ∈ (vn, vn+1] such that there exists a strategy P := P ′ ∪ {y}
with P ′ = {p1, . . . , pk}, integer values n′, a, b with 0 6 n′ < n and 0 6 a, b 6 n, an integer
j ∈ {0, 1, 2}, and a δ′ ∈ {strict, loose} satisfying the following conditions:
1. P wins at least γ voters from Vn,
2. P induces an `-threshold τ with strictness δ on Vn,
3. span(pk, n, a, b) = y,
4. P ′ realizes Xmax(n′, k − 1, `− j, γ − n+ n′ + a⊕j b, δ′),
5. Let M(Vn′ , P ′, `− j) := 〈m′0, . . . ,m′k〉 and M(Vn, P, `) := 〈m0, . . . ,mk+1〉. Then m′i = mi
for all 0 6 i < k.
When a set P satisfying the conditions exists, we say that P realizes Xmax(n, k, `, γ, δ). We
define Xmax(n, k, `, γ, δ) = −∞ if no such P exists.
By induction we can show that if the parameters n, k, ` are not in a certain range, namely if
one of the conditions ` < 2(k + 1) or k 6 ‖Vn‖ is violated, then Xmax(n, k, `, γ, δ) = −∞. The next
lemma shows we can compute Γk∗,`∗(V ) from the solutions to our subproblems.
Lemma 5. Let V = {v1, . . . , vn∗} be a set of n∗ voters in R1. Let 0 6 k∗ 6 n∗ and 1 6 `∗ 6 n∗ be
two integers such that `∗ < 2k∗ and k∗ < ‖V ‖, and let τ be a fixed threshold. Then
Γk∗,`∗(V ) > the maximum value of γ with 0 6 γ 6 n∗ for which there exist
a δ ∈ {loose, strict} such that Xmax(n∗, k∗, `∗, γ, δ) =∞.
(1)
Moreover, for an optimal threshold τopt > 0, the inequality changes to equality.
Proof. It is clear that Γk∗,`∗(V ) is at least equal to the right-hand side in (1). Indeed, an equation
Xmax(n
∗, k∗, `∗, γ, δ) = ∞ implies by definition that there is a strategy P ′ of k∗ points such that
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P ′ ∪ {∞} wins at least γ voters against an opponent Q with `∗ points, and then P ′ must win γ
voters as well. Next we prove the opposite direction for an optimal threshold τopt.
Let Popt be the canonical strategy realizing Γk∗,`∗(V ). By definition, τopt is an `∗-threshold
induced by Popt on V . Let Qopt be the canonical strategy of Q with `∗ points against Popt on V and
let M(V, Popt, `∗) = 〈m0, . . . ,mk∗〉 be its sequence representation. Define Pk := {p1, . . . , pk, pk+1}
and Qk := Qopt ∩ [−∞, pk+1], and let nk be the largest index such that vnk < pk+1. Let `k = |Qk|,
and γk = |Vnk [Pk  Qk]|, that is, γk is the number of voters from Vnk won by Pk against Qk.
Note that τopt is an `k-threshold of Pk on Vnk . Let δk ∈ {strict, loose} indicate whether our fixed
threshold τopt is a strict or loose threshold induced by Pk and `k on Vnk , where pk∗+1 :=∞.
We will need the following claim.
Claim. Qk is the canonical strategy of Q with `k points against Pk on Vnk , and for all
0 6 k 6 k∗ we have M(Vnk , Pk, Qk) = 〈m0, . . . ,mk, 0〉.
Proof of claim. The second part of the claim is obvious by the definition of sequence
representation and by the definition of Qk.
The first part of the claim can be shown by contradiction. Suppose Q′k is the
canonical strategy of Q with `k points against Pk on Vnk , where Q′k 6= Qk. Let
M(Vnk , Pk, Q
′
k) = 〈m′0, . . . ,m′k, 0〉. Consider the strategy Q with sequence represen-
tation 〈m′0, . . . ,m′k,mk+1, . . . ,mk∗〉 of size `∗ against Popt. We have two cases.
• Qk is not an optimal strategy against Pk. This means Q wins more voters than
Qopt against Popt, because the winning of any given voter by Q is only dependent
on the number of points Q places in the interval (pi, pi+1) containing that voter.
But this contradicts the fact that Qopt is an optimal strategy against Popt.
• Qk is an optimal strategy against Pk, but Qk is smaller in the lexicographical order
than Q′k. This means that Q is a strategy of equal gain as Qopt whose sequence
representation is lexicographically larger. But this contradicts the fact that Qopt is
a canonical strategy against Popt.
/
Let Ik denote the subproblem given by 〈nk, k, `k, γk, δk〉 for τ = τopt. Below we will show by induction
on k that for any 0 6 k 6 k∗ we have
Xmax(Ik) = pk+1 and Xmax(Ik) is realized by Pk, (2)
where we use Xmax(Ik) as a shorthand for Xmax(nk, k, `k, γk, δk). Note that (2) finishes the proof of
the lemma. Indeed, pk∗+1 =∞ by definition, and nk∗ = n∗ which implies Vnk∗ = V . Hence, γk∗ =
Γk∗,`∗(V ) and `k∗ = `∗, and so there is a δ ∈ {loose, strict} such thatXmax(n∗, k∗, `∗,Γk∗,`∗(V ), δk∗) =
∞, thus finishing the proof. It remains to prove (2).
Base case: k = 0. By definition n0 is such that vn0 < p1 and vn0+1 > p1. Moreover, p1 ∈ V by
Observation 1. Hence, we have vn0+1 = p1, which establishes (2).
Induction step: k > 0. We first prove that y := pk+1 satisfies all five conditions from Definition 4
for a := gainα(V, pk, pk+1) and b := gainβ(V, pk, pk+1), and for j := mk and δ′ := δk. This
implies that Xmax(Ik) > pk+1. After that we argue there is no larger value of y satisfying all
conditions, thus finishing the proof.
1. Pk wins at least γk voters from Vnk .
Pk wins γk voters against Qk by definition. Moreover, by the Claim above, Qk is an
optimal strategy for Q against Pk on Vnk . Hence, Pk can win γk voters from Vnk .
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2. Pk induces an `-threshold τopt with strictness δk on Vnk .
This is true by definition.
3. span(pk, nk, a, b) = pk+1.
Obviously span(pk, nk, a, b) > pk+1. Now let y := span(pk, nk, a, b) and assume for a
contradiction that y > pk+1. In the next paragraph, we will argue that this implies that
P := {p1, . . . , pk, y, pk+2, . . . , pk∗} realizes Γk∗,`∗(V ). This gives the desired contradiction
since P is then an optimal strategy that is lexicographically greater than the canonical
strategy Popt.
Since the only difference between P and Popt is that pk+1 is moved to the right to the
position y, the intervals (pi, pi+1) only change for i = k and for i = k+1. Thus the possible
gains for Q in all intervals stay the same, except possibly in (pk, pk+1) and (pk+1, pk+2).
Since a = gainα(V, pk, pk+1) and b = gainβ(V, pk, pk+1) and y = span(pk, nk, a, b) by
definition, the gains in (pk, pk+1) are the same as the gains in (pk, y). Finally, since
(y, pk+2) ⊂ (pk+1, pk+2), it is clear that Q cannot win more voters in (y, pk+2) against
P than she can win in (pk+1, pk+2) against Popt by playing a single point inside these
intervals. Similarly, she cannot win more voters by playing two points in (y, pk+2), as
compared to playing two points in (pk+1, pk+2). Hence, P wins at least the same number
of voters as Popt and so P realizes Γk∗,`∗(V ).
4. Pk−1 realizes Xmax(nk−1, k − 1, `k − j, γk − nk + nk−1 + a⊕j b, δk−1) for j = mk.
By the induction hypothesis and since `k−1 = `k − j by definition, Pk−1 realizes
Xmax(nk−1, k − 1, `k − j, γk−1, δk−1). By the above Claim, Qk−1 is optimal against Pk−1
on Vnk−1 and Qk is optimal against Pk on Vnk . Hence, γk−1 = γk − nk + nk−1 + a⊕j b,
which proves the condition.
5. Let M(Vnk−1 , Pk−1, `k−1) := 〈m′0, . . . ,m′k〉 and M(Vnk , Pk, `k) := 〈m0, . . . ,mk+1〉. Then
m′i = mi for all 0 6 i < k.
This is true by the above Claim.
We still need to show that pk+1 is the maximum value in (vn, vn+1] satisfying the above
mentioned conditions. This is obvious for k = k∗. For k < k∗, with a similar reasoning to the
proof of the third condition, we can show that pk+1 is the maximum value in (vn, vn+1] satisfying
the conditions, as otherwise Popt cannot be the canonical strategy realizing Γk∗,`∗(V ). Namely,
we assume y ∈ (vn, vn+1] with y > pk+1 is the solution to Ik realized by P ′k := {p′1, . . . , p′k, y},
and then we argue that P := {p′1, . . . , p′k, y, pk+2, . . . , pk∗} is an optimal solution, thus obtaining
a contradiction since P is lexicographically larger than Popt. It remains to prove that P is
optimal.
We show that any other strategy Q against P on V cannot win more voters than Qopt wins
against Popt, which shows P realizes Γk∗,`∗(V ) and is therefore optimal. Let Q′k be the canonical
strategy of Q with `k points against P ′k on Vnk . As P ′k wins at least γk voters and by definition
of γk, Pk wins exactly γk voters, the number of voters Q′k wins against P
′
k cannot be more
than the number of voters Qk, which is part of Qopt, wins against Pk.
Let a := gainα(V, pk+1, pk+2), and b := gainβ(V, pk+1, pk+2). Any strategy Q against P must
select its gains from the gain sequence Σgain(V, P ). But, all the gains in Σgain(V, P ) are either
the same gains chosen by Q′k or Qopt of a value at least τopt, or they have a value of at most
τopt because of the threshold τopt. The only exceptions are the gains in interval (y, pk+2) where
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by moving pk+1 to the right a does not increase, but b might increase. But, even in that case
when b increases and its value gets bigger than τopt and it is chosen by Q, it means a is chosen
by both Qopt and Q. Hence, any extra voters won by Q through selecting the gain b are stolen
from a which means the number of voters won by Q does not increase.
Remark. Usually in dynamic programming, subproblems have a clean non-recursive definition—the
recursion only comes in when a recursive formula is given to compute the value of an optimal solution.
Our approach is more complicated: Definition 4 above gives a recursive but “non-constructive’
subproblem definition (and Lemma 5 shows how to use it) and Lemma 8 below will then give a
different recursive formula to actually compute the solutions to the subproblems.
2.3 Computing solutions to subproblems
The solution to an elementary subproblem follows fairly easily from the definitions, and can be
computed in constant time.
Lemma 6. Assuming the voter set V is given in sorted order, we can find the solution to an
elementary subproblem in constant time.
Proof. Consider an elementary subproblem I = 〈n, 0, `, γ, δ〉. If ` = 0 then Xmax(I) = vn+1 if and
only if the following two conditions hold: (i) γ 6 n and (ii) τ > n or (τ = n and δ = loose). If ` = 1
then Xmax(I) = vn+1 if and only if (i) γ = 0 and (ii) τ < n or (τ = n and δ = strict). Otherwise
Xmax(I) = −∞.
By definition, in order to obtain a strategy P realizing the solution to a non-elementary subproblem
I = 〈n, k, `, γ, δ〉 of size k, we need a solution to a smaller subproblem I ′ = 〈n′, k − 1, `′, γ′, δ′〉 of
size k − 1 and add one point y ∈ (vn, vn+1] to the strategy P ′ = {p1, . . . , pk} realizing I ′. Thus by
adding y, we extend the solution to I ′ to get a solution to I. To find the “right” subproblem I ′,
we guess some values for n′, a, b, j ∈ {0, 1, 2}, and δ′ ∈ {strict, loose}; these values are enough to
specify I ′. We note that there are just a polynomial number of cases and therefore a polynomial
number of values for the value y ∈ (vn, vn+1] which we want to maximize. Namely, there are O(n)
choices for the values n′, a, and b, three choices for j, and two choices for δ′. This makes O(n3)
different cases to be considered for each subproblem I, in total. However, not all those subproblems
can be extended to I. In the following definition, we list the triples (δ′, j, δ) that provide all the
valid combinations that guarantee the extendibility of I ′ to I.
Let a and b be the α-gain and β-gain of the interval (pk, y) in a strategy P = {p1, . . . , pk, y} with
threshold τ . We define the following sets of triples depending on the relationship between a, b and τ :
∆(τ, a, b) :=
{(loose, 2, loose), (strict, 2, strict)} if a > τ ∧ b > τ
{(loose, 1, loose), (strict, 1, loose), (strict, 2, strict)} if a > τ ∧ b = τ
{(loose, 1, loose), (strict, 1, strict)} if a > τ ∧ b < τ
{(loose, 0, loose), (strict, 0, loose), (strict, 1, loose), (strict, 2, strict)} if a = τ ∧ b = τ
{(loose, 0, loose), (strict, 0, loose), (strict, 1, strict)} if a = τ ∧ b < τ
{(loose, 0, loose), (strict, 0, strict)} if a < τ ∧ b < τ.
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Lemma 7. Let P ′ = {p1, . . . , pk} and P := P ′∪{y}, be two reasonable strategies on Vn′ and Vn, where
n′ = argmax16i6n∗ vi < pk, n = argmax16i6n∗ vi < y, and y ∈ (vn, vn+1]. Let a = gainα(Vn, pk, y)
and b = gainβ(Vn, pk, y), and assume τ > 0 is an (`− j)-threshold of strictness δ′ for Q induced by
P ′ on Vn′, where j ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Then, there exists a triple (δ′, j, δ) ∈ ∆(τ, a, b) if and only if
1. P induces an `-threshold τ with strictness δ on Vn,
2. Let M(Vn′ , P ′, `− j) := 〈m′0, . . . ,m′k〉 and M(Vn, P, `) := 〈m0, . . . ,mk+1〉. Then m′i = mi for
all 0 6 i < k.
Moreover, this triple is unique if it exists.
Proof. We prove the lemma for the case τ = a = b. The proof for the other cases is similar.
LetQ′ andQ be canonical strategies associated withM(Vn′ , P ′, `−j) andM(Vn, P, `), respectively,
and let Σgain(Vn′ , P ′) = 〈τ ′1, . . . , τ ′2k+2〉. We note that Σgain(Vn, P ) can be constructed by inserting
a and b after the last τ value in Σgain(Vn′ , P ′). There are six cases,
• δ′ = loose and j = 0.
In this case (loose, 0, loose) is the only corresponding triple in ∆(τ, a, b). As δ′ = loose, we
have τ ′`−j+1 = τ , and therefore a and b are not selected by Q. Therefore Q
′ = Q and the
strictness status also does not change. Hence both conditions are satisfied and δ = loose.
• δ′ = strict and j = 0.
In this case (strict, 0, loose) is the only corresponding triple in ∆(τ, a, b). As δ′ = strict, we
have τ ′`−j+1 < τ , and therefore a and b are not selected by Q; however, the strictness of the
`-threshold τ for P is different. Hence both conditions are satisfied and δ = loose.
• δ′ = loose and j = 1.
As δ′ = loose, we have τ ′`−j+1 = τ , and therefore a and b are not selected by Q. However,
the gain τ ′`−j+1 is selected by Q which violates the condition 2. We also note that there is no
corresponding triple in ∆(τ, a, b) for this case.
• δ′ = strict and j = 1.
In this case (strict, 1, loose) is the only corresponding triple in ∆(τ, a, b). As δ′ = strict, we
have τ ′`−j+1 < τ , and therefore a is selected by Q and b is not selected, and the strictness of
the `-threshold τ for P is different. Hence both conditions are satisfied and δ = loose.
• δ′ = strict and j = 2.
In this case (strict, 2, strict) is the only corresponding triple in ∆(τ, a, b). As δ′ = strict, we
have τ ′`−j+1 < τ , and therefore both a and b are selected by Q, and the strictness of the
`-threshold τ for P is the same. Hence both conditions are satisfied and δ = strict.
• δ′ = loose and j = 2.
As δ′ = loose, we have τ ′`−j+1 = τ , and therefore just a is selected by Q, while b is not selected.
However, the gain τ ′`−j+1 is selected by Q which violates the condition 2. We also note that
there is no corresponding triple in ∆(τ, a, b) for this case.
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Lemma 8. For a non-elementary subproblem I = 〈n, k, `, γ, δ〉, we have
Xmax(n, k, `, γ, δ) = max
06n′<n
max
06a6n
max
06b6n
max
(δ′,j,δ)∈∆(τ,a,b)
span
(
Xmax(n
′, k − 1, `− j, γ − n+ n′ + a⊕j b, δ′), n, a, b
)
.
Proof. As stated earlier, when one of the conditions ` < 2(k + 1) or k 6 ‖Vn‖ is violated, the
left hand side evaluates to −∞. When this happens, then the corresponding condition for each
subproblem Xmax(n′, k − 1, `− j, γ − n+ n′ + a⊕j b, δ′) is also violated, i.e. (`− j) < 2((k − 1) + 1)
or (k − 1) 6 ‖Vn′‖. Hence, each of these subproblems and the right hand side evaluates to −∞, too.
When ` < 2(k + 1) and k 6 ‖Vn‖ are both satisfied, we prove the lemma as follows.
Let y be the solution to I and let this solution be realized by the strategy P := P ′ ∪ {y} for
some P ′ = {p1, . . . , pk}. By definition, P ′ realizes Xmax(n′, k − 1, ` − j, γ − n + n′ + a ⊕j b, δ′)
for some δ′ ∈ {loose, strict} and j ∈ {0, 1, 2} where a = gainα(Vn, pk, y), b = gainβ(Vn, pk, y), and
n′ = argmaxi vi < pk. By the second and fifth conditions of a subproblem and Lemma 7, we have
(δ′, j, δ) ∈ ∆(τ, a, b), which shows
Xmax(n, k, `, γ, δ) 6 max
06n′<n
max
06a6n
max
06b6a
max
(δ′,j,δ)∈∆(τ,a,b)
span(Xmax(n
′, k − 1, `− j, γ − n+ n′ + a⊕j b, δ′), n, a, b).
Conversely, consider a value y = span(y′, n, a, b) > −∞, where y′ = Xmax(n′, k − 1, ` − j, γ −
n′ + n′′ + a ⊕j b, δ′) is realized by P ′ = {p1, . . . , pk} for some values n′,a,b,δ′, and j such that
(δ′, j, δ) ∈ ∆(τ, a, b). Let P := P ′ ∪ {y}. It is not hard to verify that the conditions for y to be a
solution to I realized by P are satisfied by these values. Indeed, we have:
1. P wins at least γ voters from Vn.
By the second and the fifth conditions and the fact that τ > 0, we have Mk = j which shows
P can win at least γ voters.
2. P induces an `-threshold τ with strictness δ on Vn.
This condition is satisfied by Condition 1 of Lemma 7 and by the uniqueness of δ.
3. span(pk, n, a, b) = y.
This condition is satisfied by the assumption.
4. P ′ realizes Xmax(n′, k − 1, `− j, γ − n+ n′ + a⊕j b, δ′).
This condition is satisfied by the assumption.
5. Let M(Vn′ , P ′, ` − j) = 〈m′0, . . . ,m′k〉 and M(Vn, P, `) = 〈m0, . . . ,mk+1〉. Then m′i = mi for
all 0 6 i < k.
This condition is satisfied by Condition 2 of Lemma 7.
As all the conditions are satisfied, we have
Xmax(n, k, `, γ, δ) > max
06n′<n
max
06a6n
max
06b6a
max
(δ′,j,δ)∈∆(τ,a,b)
span(Xmax(n
′, k − 1, `− j, γ − n+ n′ + a⊕j b, δ′), n, a, b),
which completes the proof.
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Figure 1: a) A-map of V = {1, 4, 6, 13, 17, 23} with the corresponding α-gain for each region.
b) B-map of V with the corresponding β-gain for each region.
If we can compute the span function efficiently, we can compute all the solutions by dynamic
programming and solve the problem. However, a solution based on a trivial dynamic-programming al-
gorithm will be of running time complexity bn∗/`∗c ·O(k∗`∗(n∗)2) ·O((n∗)3f(n∗)) = O(k∗(n∗)6f(n∗))
where bn∗/`∗c is the total number of choices for the threshold, O(k∗`∗(n∗)2) is the number of sub-
problems for each threshold, and O((n∗)3f(n∗)) is the time needed to solve each subproblem where
f(n) is the time needed to compute the span(x, n, a, b) function. This algorithm is quite slow. More
importantly it is not easy to compute the span function. In the following, we introduce some new
concepts to compute the span function and also get a better running time.
2.4 Computing the span function using gain maps
Before we give the algorithm we introduce the gain map, which we need to compute the span function.
Consider an arbitrary strategy P of P on V , and recall that such a strategy induces open intervals
of the form (pi, pi+1) where Q can place her points. We can represent any possible interval (x, y)
that may arise in this manner as a point (x, y) in the plane. Thus the locus of all possible intervals
is the region R := {(x, y) : x < y}. We will define two subdivisions of this region, the A-map and
the B-map, and the gain map will then be the overlay of the A-map and the B-map.
The A-map is the subdivision of R into regions At and Bt, for 0 6 t 6 n∗, defined as follows:
At := {(x, y) : gainα(V, x, y) = t} and
Bt := {(x, y) : gainα(V, x, y) + gainβ(V, x, y) = t}.
In other words, At is the locus of all intervals (x, y) such that, if (x, y) is an interval induced by P ,
then Q can win t voters (but no more than t) from V ∩ (x, y) by placing a single point in (x, y).
To construct the A-map, let A>t denote the locus of all intervals (x, y) such that gainα(V, x, y) > t.
Note that At = A>t \A>t+1. For 1 6 i 6 n∗ − t+ 1, let V ti := {vi, . . . , vi+t−1} and define
A>ti := {(x, y) :V ti ⊂ (x, y) and
Q can win all voters in V ti by placing a single point in (x, y)}.
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Then we have A>ti = {(x, y) : x < vi and y > vi+t−1 and y > x+2(vi+t−1−vi)}. Here the conditions
x < vi and y > vi+t−1 are needed to guarantee that V ti ⊂ (x, y). The condition y > x+2(vi+t−1−vi)
implies that V ti can be covered with an interval of length (y− x)/2, which is necessary and sufficient
for Q to be able to win all these voters. Note that each region A>ti is the intersection of three
halfplanes, bounded by a vertical, a horizontal and a diagonal line, respectively.
Since Q can win at least t voters in inside (x, y) with a single point if she can win at least t
consecutive voters with a single point, we have A>t =
⋃n∗−t+1
i=1 A
>t
i . Thus A
>t is a polygonal region,
bounded from below and from the right by a a polyline consisting of horizontal, vertical, and diagonal
segments, and the regions At are sandwiched between such polylines; see Figure 1a. We call the
polylines that form the boundary between consecutive regions At boundary polylines.
The B-map can be constructed in a similar, but easier manner. Indeed, Bt is the locus of all
intervals such that Q can win t voters (but no more) from V ∩ (x, y), and this is the case if and
only if |V ∩ (x, y)| = t. Hence, Bt is the union of the rectangular regions [vi, vi+1)× (vi+t, vi+t+1]
(intersected with R), for 0 6 i 6 n∗ − t, where v0 := −∞ and vn∗+1 :=∞, as shown in Figure 1b.
As mentioned, by overlaying the A- and B-map, we get the gain map. For any given region on
this map, the intervals corresponding to points inside this region have equal α-gain and equal β-gain.
Lemma 9. The complexity of the gain-map is O((n∗)2).
Proof. The boundary polylines in the A-map are xy-monotone and comprised of vertical, horizontal,
and diagonal lines. The B-map is essentially a grid of size O((n∗)2) defined by the lines x = vi
and y = vi, for 1 6 i 6 n∗. Since each of these lines intersects any xy-monotone polyline at most
once—in a point or in a vertical segment—the complexity of the gain map is also O((n∗)2).
Using the gain map, we can compute the values span(x0, n, a, b) for a given x0 ∈ R and for all
triples n, a, b satisfying 1 6 n 6 n∗, and 0 6 a 6 n∗ and 0 6 b 6 n∗, as follows. First, we compute the
intersection points of the vertical line x = x0 with (the edges of) the gain map, sorted by increasing
y-coordinates. (If this line intersects the gain map in a vertical segment, we take the topmost
endpoint of the segment.) Let (x0, y1), . . . , (x0, yz) denote this sorted sequence of intersection points,
where z 6 2n∗ denotes the number of intersections. Let ai and bi denote the α-gain and β-gain of
the interval corresponding to the point (x0, yi), and let az+1 and bz+1 denote the α-gain and β-gain
of the unbounded region intersected by the line x = x0. Define ni = argmaxn vn < yi. Then we have
span(x0, n, a, b) =

yi if a = ai and b = bi, and n = ni, for some 1 6 i 6 z
+∞ if a = az+1 and b = bz+1 and n = n∗
−∞ for all other triples n, a, b
(3)
Our algorithm presented below moves a sweep line from left to right over the gain map. During
the sweep we maintain the intersections of the sweep line with the gain map. It will be convenient
to maintain the intersections with the A-map and the B-map separately. We will do so using two
sequences, A(x0) and B(x0).
• The sequence A(x0) is the sequence of all diagonal or horizontal edges in the A-map that are
intersected by the line x = x0, ordered from bottom to top along the line. (More precisely, the
sequence contains (at most) one edge for any boundary polyline. When the sweep line reaches
the endpoint of such an edge, the edge will be removed and it will be replaced by the next
non-vertical edge of that boundary polyline, if it exists.)
• The sequence B(x0) is the sequence of the y-coordinates of the horizontal segments in the
B-map intersected by the line x = x0, ordered from bottom to top along the line.
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The number of intersections of the A-map, and also of the B-map, with the line x = x0 is equal
to n∗ − n0 + 1, where n0 = argminn vn > x0. Hence, the sequences A(x0) and B(x0) have
length n∗ − n0 + 1 6 n∗ + 1.
If we have the sequences A(x0) and B(x0) available then, using Equation (3), we can easily find
all triples n, a, b such that span(x0, n, a, b) 6= −∞ (and the corresponding y-values) by iterating over
the two sequences. We summarize the results of this section in the following observation.
Observation 10. If we know the sequences A(x0) and B(x0) then we can compute all the values
span(x0, n, a, b), with 1 6 n 6 n∗ and 0 6 a, b 6 n, that are not equal to −∞ in O(n∗) time in total.
This observation, together with Lemma 8 forms the basis of our dynamic-programming algorithm.
2.5 The sweep-line based dynamic-programming algorithm
Usually in a dynamic-programming algorithm, the value of a subproblem is computed by looking
up the values of certain smaller subproblems. In our case it is hard to determine which smaller
subproblems we need, so we take the opposite approach: whenever we have computed the value of a
subproblem we determine which other subproblems can use this value, and we update their solutions
if necessary. To this end we will use a sweep-line approach, moving a vertical line from left to right
over the gain map. We will maintain a table X, indexed by subproblems, such that when the sweep
line is at position x0, then X[I] holds the best solution known so far for subproblem I, where the
effect of all the subproblems with solution smaller than x0 have been taken into account. When our
sweep reaches a subproblem I ′, then we check which later subproblems I can use I ′ in their solution,
and we update the solutions to these subproblems.
Recall the algorithm works with a fixed threshold value τ ∈ {1, . . . , bn∗/`∗c} and that its goal is
to compute the values Xmax(n∗, k∗, `∗, γ, δ) for all 0 6 γ 6 n∗ and δ ∈ {strict, loose}. Our algorithm
maintains the following data structures.
• A[0..n∗] is an array that stores the sequence A(x0), where x0 is the current position of the
sweep line and A[i] contains the i-th element in the sequence. When the i-th element does not
exist then A[i] = Nil.
• Similarly, B[0..n∗] is an array that stores the sequence B(x0).
• X: This is a table with an entry for each subproblem I = 〈n, k, `, γ, δ〉 with 0 6 n 6 n∗, and
0 6 k 6 k∗ and 0 6 ` 6 `∗, and 0 6 γ 6 n∗ and δ ∈ {strict, loose}. When the sweep line is
at position x0, then X[I] holds the best solution known so far for subproblem I, where the
effect of all the subproblems with solution smaller than x0 have been taken into account. More
precisely, in the right-hand side of the equation in Lemma 8 we have taken the maximum
value over all subproblems I ′ = 〈n′, k− 1, `− j, γ − n+ n′ + a⊕j b, δ′〉 with Xmax(I ′) < x0. In
the beginning of the algorithm the entries for elementary subproblems are computed using
Lemma 6 and all other entries have value −∞.
• E: This is the event queue, which will contain four types of events, as explained below.
The event queue E is a min-priority queue on the x-value of the events. There are four types of
events, as listed next, and when events have the same x-value then the first event type (in the
list below) has higher priority, that is, will be handled first. When two events of the same type
have equal x-value then their order is arbitrary. Note that events with the same x-value are not
degenerate cases—this is inherent to the structure of the algorithms, as many events take place at
x-coordinates corresponding to voters.
A-map events, denoted by eA(a, s, s′): At an A-map event, the edge s of the A-map ends—thus
the x-value of an A-map event is the x-coordinate of the right endpoint of s—and the array A
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must be updated by replacing it with the edge s′. Here s′ is the next non-vertical edge along
the boundary polyline that s is part of, where s′ = Nil if s is the last non-vertical edge of the
boundary polyline. The value a indicates that the edge s is on the boundary polyline between
Aa and Aa+1. In other words s (and s′, if it exist) are the a-th intersection point, 0 6 a < n∗,
with the A-map along the current sweep line, and so we must update the entry A[a] by setting
A[a]← s′.
B-map events, denoted by eB(vn): At a B-map event, a horizontal edge of the B-map ends.
This happens when the sweep line reaches a voter vn—that is, when x0 = xn—and so the
x-value of this event is vn. The bottommost intersection of he sweep line with the B-map now
disappears (see Figure 1b), and so we must update B by shifting all other intersection points
one position down in B and setting B[n∗ − n]← Nil.
Subproblem events, denoted by eX(n′, k′, `′, γ′, δ′): At a subproblem event the solution to the
subproblem given by I ′ = 〈n′, k′, `′, γ′, δ′〉 is known and the x-value of this event is equal to
Xmax(I
′). Handling the subproblem event for I ′ entails deciding which later subproblems I
can use I ′ in their solution and how they can use it, using the sets ∆(τ, a, b), and updating the
solutions to these subproblems.
In the beginning of the algorithm all the events associated with elementary subproblems are
known. The events associated with non-elementary subproblems are added to the event queue
when handling an update event eE(vn), as discussed next.
Update events, denoted by eE(vn): At the update event happening at x-value vn, all subproblem
events of size n are added to the event queue E. These are simply the subproblems 〈n, k, `, γ, δ〉
for all k, `, γ ∈ {0, . . . , n} and δ ∈ {strict, loose}. The reason we could not add them at
the start of the algorithm was that the x-value of such a subproblem I was now known yet.
However, when we reach vn then Xmax(I) is determined, so we can add the event to E with
Xmax(I) as its x-value.
The pseudocode below summarizes the algorithm.
Lemma 11. Algorithm 1 correctly computes the solutions for subproblems 〈n, k, `, γ, δ〉 for the given
value τ , for all n, k, `, γ, δ with 0 6 n 6 n∗, and 0 6 k, `, γ 6 n, and δ ∈ {strict, loose}, and
` < 2(k + 1). The running time of the algorithm is O(k∗`∗(n∗)3).
Proof. We handle the A-map and B-map events before a subproblem event so that A and B data
structures are up-to-date when we want to compute the span function on handling a subproblem
event. We also handle a subproblem event before an update event so that when we want to add a
new subproblem event to the event queue on handling an update event, its entry in table X has the
correct value. The correctness of the algorithm now follows from the discussion and lemmas above.
The running time is dominated by the handling of the subproblem events. By Observation 10,
the algorithm handles each subproblem in O(n∗) time, plus O(log n∗) for operations on the event
queue, and there are O(k∗`∗(n∗)2) subproblems. Hence, the total running time is O(k∗`∗(n∗)3).
By Lemmas 5 and 11, the algorithm described at the beginning of Section 2.2 computes Γk∗,`∗(V )
correctly. Since this algorithm calls ComputeSolutions bn∗/`∗c times in Step 1, we obtain the
following theorem.
Theorem 12. There exists an algorithm that computes Γk∗,`∗(V ), and thus solves the one-dimensional
case of the one-round discrete Voronoi game, in time O(k∗(n∗)4).
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Algorithm 1: ComputeSolutions(τ, V, k∗, `∗)
1 for i← 0 to n∗ − 1 do
2 A[i]← (vi, vi+1)− (vi+1, vi+1); B[i]← vi+1 . define v0 := v1 − 1
3 A[n∗]← Nil; B[n∗]← Nil
4 Initialize X by the solutions to elementary subproblems
5 Initialize E by all map events, update events, and elementary subproblem events
6 while E is not empty do
7 e← extractMin(E); x0 ← x-value of e
8 switch e do
9 case eA(a, s, s′) do
10 A[a]← s′
11 case eE(vn) do
12 B[n∗ − n]← Nil
13 for i← 0 to n∗ − n− 1 do
14 B[i]← vn+i+1
15 case eX(n′, k′, `′, γ′, δ′) do
16 for all span(x0, n, a, b) = y where y 6= −∞ do
17 for all (δ′, j, δ) ∈ ∆(τ, a, b) do
18 I ← 〈n, k′ + 1, `′ + j, γ′ + n− n′ − gainj(a, b), δ〉
19 X(I)← max(X(I), y)
20 case eE(vn) do
21 Add all the events for subproblems of size n to E, as explained above
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(a) (b) (c)
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c2
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t1 t2
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Figure 2: a) Bar graph of the boolean expression ∀s1 ∃t1, t2 : c1 ∧ c2, where c1 := s¯1 ∨ t1 ∨ t2 and
c2 := s1 ∨ t1 ∨ t¯2. b) Representation of variables in the transformed graph. c) Representation of a
clause in the transformed graph.
Remark. We can also solve the one-dimensional case of the one-round discrete Voronoi game when
voters are weighted, i.e. each voter v ∈ V has an associated weight ω(v) and the players try to
maximize the total weight of the voters they win. In this case, the α-gain and β-gain of an interval
is defined as the total weight of voters the second player can win in that interval by placing one
point and two points, respectively. The number of possible thresholds is not an integer in range
[0, n∗], but the sum of any sequence of consecutive voters define a threshold, which makes a total of
O((n∗)2) different thresholds. The gain map also becomes more complex and in the algorithm we
need to spend O((n∗)2) time (instead of O(n∗)) to handle each subproblem event, which results in
an algorithm with running time O(k∗`∗(n∗)5).
3 ΣP2 -Hardness for d > 2
In this section we prove that the one-round discrete Voronoi game is ΣP2 -hard in R2, which implies
hardness for d > 2 as well. To prove this, it suffices to show that deciding if Q has a winning strategy
against every possible strategy of P is ΠP2 -hard. Our proof will use a reduction from a special
case of the quantified Boolean formula problem (qbf), as defined next. Let S := {s1, . . . , sns} and
T := {t1, . . . , tnt} be two sets of variables, and let S¯ := {s¯1, . . . , s¯ns} and T¯ := {t¯1, . . . , t¯nt} denote
their negated counterparts. We consider Boolean formulas B of the form
B := ∀s1, . . . , sns∃t1, . . . , tnt : c1 ∧ · · · ∧ cnc
where each clause ci in C := {c1, . . . , cnc} is a disjunctive combination of at most three literals from
S ∪ S¯ ∪ T ∪ T¯ . Deciding if a formula of this form is true is a ΠP2 -complete problem [18].
Consider the undirected graph GB := (N,A) representing B, where N := S ∪ T ∪ C is the set of
nodes of GB and A := {(ci, sj) : sj ∈ ci ∨ s¯j ∈ ci} ∪ {(ci, tj) : tj ∈ ci ∨ t¯j ∈ ci} is the set of edges
of GB. Lichtenstein [12] showed how to transform an instance of qbf in polynomial time to an
equivalent one whose corresponding graph is planar (and of quadratic size). We can use the same
technique here. Hence, we may start our reduction from an Boolean formula B such that GB is
planar. We call the resulting problem Planar ∀∃3-cnf.
In the following, we transform an instance of Planar ∀∃3-cnf to an instance 〈V, k, `〉 of the
Voronoi game problem in the plane such that B is true if and only if Q has a winning strategy.
The first (and standard) step in our reduction is to construct a specific embedding of the planar
graph GB . More precisely, we use a bar graph, where each node is represented by a horizontal segment
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and each edge is represented by a vertical segment; see Figure 2a. Rosenstiehl and Tarjan [16]
showed that such a representation always exists. Before we describe the specific variable, clause, and
edge gadgets that we use, it is useful to make the following observation about when Q wins a certain
voter vi ∈ V , when the strategy P of P is fixed. Define Di, the disk of vi with respect to the given
set P , as the disk with center vi and radius dist(vi, P ), that is, Di is the largest disk centered at vi
that has no point from P in its interior. The key to our reduction is the following simple observation.
Observation 13. Player Q wins a voter vi ∈ V against P if and only if she places a point q in the
interior of Di.
Next we describe how to transform the bar graph GB into a voter set V . Because of the above
observation, it will be convenient to imagine that each voter is surrounded by a disk, and talk about
placing disks. Thus, whenever we say we place a disk somewhere, in our construction we actually
place a voter at the center of the disk. Later we will then put more voters that will force most of
P ’s strategy, so that these disks become meaningful. The nodes of GB are replaced by the following
gadgets:
Clause gadgets. Each node ci ∈ C is transformed to a single disk as shown in Figure 2c. Recall
that each such node is a horizontal segment, which has three incoming edges from its constituent
literals. The position of the voter for ci is (roughly) the point where the middle edge arrives at
the segment.
Variable gadgets. Each node ti of degree deg(ti) in graph GB is transformed to a ring of an even
number of disks numbered in counterclockwise order starting from any arbitrary disk, which
we call a closed necklace, containing at least 2 deg(ti) disks as shown in Figure 2b.
Each node si of degree deg(si) in graph GB is transformed to a ring of disks with one disk
missing numbered in counterclockwise order starting from the disk after the missing disk,
which we call an open necklace, as shown in Figure 2b. An open necklace has odd size and
at least 2 deg(si) + 1 disks. We can assume the distance between the two disks in the place
where the necklace is open is exactly 1. Let D1 and D2 be the two disks at distance 1, and
let z1 ∈ ∂D1 and z2 ∈ ∂D2 be the closest pair of points on the boundaries of these two disks.
(Thus dist(z1, z2) = 1.) Then we place a cluster of w voters at z1 and we place another cluster
of w voters at z2, where w is a suitable number specified later and a cluster of voters is simply
a number of coinciding voters.
Edge gadgets. Each edge {ci, sj} or {ci, tj} is replaced by a chain of disks of even length that in
one end intersects a pair of consecutive disks in a necklace corresponding to the node sj or tj ,
respectively, such that the first disk has an odd position and the next disk in clockwise order
has an even position, and in the other end intersects the disk associated with the clause ci
Similarly, each edge {ci, s¯j} or {ci, t¯j} is replaced by a chain of disks of even length that in
one end intersects a pair of consecutive disks in a necklace corresponding to the node sj or tj ,
respectively, such that the first disk has an even position and the next disk in clockwise order
has an odd position, and in the other end intersects the disk associated with the clause ci.
In our transformation of GB to an instance of the Voronoi game, we will use that V can be a multiset,
where we will use multiplicities 1, w, w+ 1, bw/2c+ 1, dw/2e+ 1, and W for the voters, for suitably
chosen values w and W . We call a cluster of i voters an i-cluster. We denote the multisets containing
clusters of 1,w, and W voters by V1, Vw, and VW , respectively. The values w and W will be chosen
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W voters
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5
∈ P ∈ P ∈ P ∈ P ∈ P
q1 q2
(b)
w + 1 voters
dw/2e+ 1 voters bw/2c+ 1 voters
(a)
Figure 3: a) When all the heavy-weight clusters of W voters are chosen by P, the best strategy of
Q to win the remaining single voters is to put his points in every other intersection of the disks of
the voters. b) An example of a balancing gadget.
such that they satisfy
w = |V1|+ 1, (4)
W = |Vw|+ |V1|+ 1. (5)
We have already described the placement of voters in V1 by describing the placement of the disks
in defining the gadgets. In our construction, for each voter v ∈ V1, we consider an imaginary disk
z(v, r) which is centered in the position of the voter v and has a radius r, which is a real number
in range 10 6 r 6 20. Each disk has a W -cluster inside it near its boundary which is denoted by
W (v). Two disks z1(v1, r1) and z2(v2, r2) either do not intersect or their interior have a non-empty
intersection (see Figure 3a). Similarly when three disks intersect, their interior have a non-empty
intersection. We also described the placement of voters in Vw when we defined the variable gadgets
for the variables si.
We call this construction the transformed graph. Now we add n′ := |VW |− |V1|+ 1 gadgets, which
we call balancing gadgets, each comprised of three clusters of sizes bw/2c+1, dw/2e+ 1, and w + 1
far away from the graph of disks and from each other as shown in Figure 3b. Let V ′ be the multiset
of all these voters.
We define V := V1 ∪Vw ∪VW ∪V ′, k := ‖VW ‖+n′+ns, ` := (|V1| −nc−ns)/2 +ns + 2n′, where
‖VW ‖ denotes the number of distinct points in VW .
Lemma 14. Q has a winning strategy in 〈V, k, `〉 if and only if B is true.
Proof. First we show that in an optimal strategy, P places his points on the most valuable positions,
i.e. ‖VW ‖ of his points on W -clusters, n′ of his points on (w + 1)-clusters, and the remaining ns
points on w-clusters where exactly one w-cluster is selected from each open necklace. Note that with
such a strategy for P, the number of remaining voters for Q is nsw + (w + 2)n′ + |V1|.
For a contradiction, assume P does not select some of the W -clusters. In that case P can
either move some of his points from balancing gadgets in which he has two or more points or some
of his points from the transformed graph which are not exactly on a W -cluster to the uncovered
W -clusters and get a better gain; because each extra point in a balancing gadget has a gain of at
most 2w + 3 < W and all the voters of the transformed graph in V1 and Vw together has a gain of
at most |Vw| + |V1| < W . Therefore, all the W -clusters will be covered by P. Moreover, P must
also select all the (w + 1) clusters; because by doing this, all the points of Q have a gain of at most
2w + 2 which is less that the gain of an unguarded balancing gadget, i.e. 2w + 3.
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Figure 4: a) The two different ways of winning all voters for Q. b) P can force Q’s game.
It is obvious that P does not place more than one point in each balancing gadget as the gain of
each extra point in a balancing gadget is at most dw/2e+1, but the guaranteed gain of a point on a w-
cluster is w. Now, we just need to show that P places all his remaining ns points on w-clusters. This
is also easy to see as if more that ns w-clusters are uncovered, Q can easily win (ns + 1)w+ (w+ 2)n′
voters which is more than the total number of remaining voters nsw + (w + 2)n′ + |V1| for Q in the
case where at most ns w-clusters are uncovered by P.
It is also easy to see that in an optimal strategy, P selects exactly one w-cluster in each open
necklace. As otherwise, at least one pair of w-clusters remains unselected and Q can gain 2w voters
using just one point, while if exactly one cluster from each pair of w-clusters is selected by P, the
maximum possible gain of each point of Q is at most w + 1 voters.
Now, assuming P plays an optimal strategy, the gain of each point of Q is at most
• w + 1 voters for a total of ns points if he puts his point close to an uncovered w-cluster,
• dw/2e+1 or bw/2c+1 voters for a total of 2n′ points if he puts his points in balancing clusters,
and
• 2 or 3 voters if he puts his points in the intersection of disks in the transformed graph.
This shows that in her optimal strategy Q places all her 2n′ points in the balancing clusters to win
all the remaining voters there, and the remaining (|V1| − nc − ns)/2 + ns points of Q will be placed
on the transformed graph.
To win the remaining voters of a necklace efficiently, Q has two choices. She can either put her
points in odd intersections or in even intersections of the necklace as shown in Figure 4a. In both
cases the number points she spends is equal to half the number of disks in the necklace. To win the
remaining voters of an open necklace, Q has just one choice. We note that the w-cluster selected
by P effectively changes the open necklace to a closed necklace with one more disk (see Figure 4b).
Depending on the w-cluster chosen by P , player Q must put her points in odd or even intersections
as shown in Figure 4b. In either case Q spends (m+ 1)/2 points, where m is the number of disks in
the open necklace. To win all the remaining voters in a chain of m disks, Q should place some points
in every other intersection of the chain in odd positions and he spends m/2 points. Alternatively,
she can place her m/2 points in even positions and also win the point in the clause on the one end
of the chain only if the other end of the chain has already been covered by one of his points in the
(open) necklace.
The placement of points by Q in odd intersections of a necklace corresponds to a true value for
the associated tj , and placement in even intersections corresponds to a false value for tj . Similarly,
selection of the starting w-cluster of an open necklace by P corresponds to a true value for the
associated sj , and selection of the ending w-cluster corresponds to a false value for sj . When Q has
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a choice to put his points in even intersections of a chain and win the voter of the associated clause
at the end of the chain, it corresponds to a true value for the associated literal of the (open) necklace
at the other end of the chain which gives the clause a true value. Intuitively, it is clear that given
an optimal strategy P , Q should use all his points to win the remaining voters and he can win the
voter associated with each clause if and only if she can satisfy that clause.
More formally, given an optimal strategy P of P, we set sj to false if the starting w-cluster in
clockwise order in the open necklace of the gadget for sj is selected in P and set it to true otherwise;
we call this set of values ŝ(P ). By using the discussion in the two previous paragraphs, we can
easily verify that if there exists an assignment t̂ for the variables tj(j = 1, . . . , nt) such that 〈ŝ(P ), t̂〉
satisfies c1 ∧ · · · ∧ cnc , then Q can win all the nsw + (w + 2)n′ + |V1| remaining voters. Conversely,
it is not hard to see that if Q can win all the nsw + (w + 2)n′ + |V1| remaining voters, then there
exists an assignment t̂ for tjs such that B is true.
Considering the fact that the number of remaining voters is exactly one more than the number
of voters directly won by P , i.e.(
nsw + (w + 2)n
′ + |V1|
)− (‖VW ‖+ nsw + (w + 1)n′) = 1,
Q has a winning strategy in 〈V, k, `〉 if and only if B is true.
Lemma 14 is not enough to show that the Voronoi game is ΣP2 -hard. We need to show that the
reduction can be done in polynomial time and therefore the resulting Voronoi game has polynomial
size.
We can easily generate balancing gadgets. Therefore we focus on drawing the transformed graph.
As stated earlier, in order to define the exact position of clusters in the transformed graph we
use a method devised by Rosenstiehl and Tarjan in [16] to draw a planar graph on a grid of size
O(n)×O(n) where each node is represented by a horizontal line segment and each edge is represented
by a vertical line segment (see Figure 2a). As the graph GB is planar, we can draw it using this
method. An (open) necklace associated with a variable tj or sj can be easily drawn as shown in
Figure 2b. With a big enough cell-size for the grid, say 1000, we can adjust the disk sizes to get the
desired properties for the intersections and also for the distance 1 between two ending disks in an
open necklace. As a node associated with a clause has a degree of at most three, it can be drawn
as in Figure 2c, and similarly with a big enough cell-size for the grid, we can adjust the size of the
disks to get an even number of disks for each chain. The W -clusters can be placed at a distance of
at most 0.1 at a rational point near the border of each disk, and placing w-clusters is also trivial.
As the total number of nodes in GB is O(ns + nt + nc), we need a grid of size O(ns + nt +
nc) · O(ns + nt + nc), and in worst case we have a constant number of disks on each edge of
this grid. Therefore, the number of disk of |V1| is bounded from above by the size of the grid, i.e.
|V1| ∈ O((ns+nt+nc)2), which means |V | ∈ O(|V1|W +nsw+ |V1|+(2w+3)n′) = O((ns+nt+nc)5).
The following theorem is the result of this discussion.
Theorem 15. The Voronoi game problem is ΣP2 -hard for d > 1.
We note that the final construction is rectilinear and therefore this reduction also works for all
the Lp norms as disks in the final construction can be replaced by Lp-disks and all the required
properties still hold. Moreover, as this reduction is done for the two-dimensional case, this hardness
result is also true for the L∞ norm, because in R2, the disks of the L∞ norm are similar to those in
the L1 norm, just rotated by pi/4.
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4 Containment in ∃∀R and the algorithm for d > 2
We now consider the one-round discrete Voronoi game in the Lp-norm, for some arbitrary p. Then a
strategy P = {p1, . . . , pk} can win a voter v ∈ V against a strategy Q = {q1, . . . , q`} if and only if
the following Boolean expression is satisfied:
win(v) :=
∨
i∈[k]
∧
j∈[`]
(distp(pi, v))
p 6 (distp(qj , v))p,
where distp is the Lp-distance. This expression has k` polynomial inequalities of degree p. The
strategy P is winning if and only if the majority of the expressions win(v1), . . . ,win(vn) are true.
Having a majority function Majority that evaluates to true if at least half of its parameters evaluates
to true, player P has a winning strategy if and only if
∃x1(p1), . . . , xd(p1), . . . , x1(pk), . . . , xd(pk)
∀x1(q1), . . . , xd(q1), . . . , x1(q`), . . . , xd(q`) : Majority(win(v1), . . . ,win(vn))
is true, where xi(·) denotes the i-th coordinate of a point.
Ajtai et al. [2] show that it is possible to construct a sorting network, often called the AKS
sorting network, composed of comparison units configured in c · log n levels, where c is a constant
and each level contains exactly bn/2c comparison units. Each comparison unit takes two numbers
as input and outputs its input numbers in sorted order. Each output of a comparison unit (except
those on the last level) feeds into exactly one input of a comparison unit in the next level, and the
input numbers are fed to the inputs of the comparison units in the first level. The outputs of the
comparison units in the last level (i.e., the outputs of the network) give the numbers in sorted order.
Using AKS sorting networks we can construct a Boolean formula of size O(nc) for some constant
c that tests if the majority of its n inputs are true as follows. Assuming the boolean value false is
smaller than the boolean value true value, we make an AKS sorting network that sorts n boolean
values. This is possible using comparison units that get p and q as input, and output p ∧ q and
p ∨ q. It is not hard to verify that the dn/2e-th output of the network is equal to the value of the
majority function on the input boolean values. By construction, we can write the Boolean formula
representing the value of this output as logical and (∧) and logical or (∨) combination of the input
boolean values, and the size of the resulting formula is O(nc).
Thus we can write Majority(win(v1), . . . ,win(vn)) as a Boolean combination of O(nck`) poly-
nomial inequalities of degree p, where each quantified block has kd and `d variables respectively.
Basu et al. [7] gave an efficient algorithm for deciding the truth of quantified formulas. For our
formula this gives an algorithm with O((nck`)(kd+1)(`d+1)pk`d2) running time to decide if P has
a winning strategy for a given instance 〈V, k, `〉 of the Voronoi game problem. Note that this is
polynomial when k, ` and d are constants.
For the L∞ norm, we can define F (v) as follows:
F (v) :=
∨
i∈[k]
∧
j∈[`]
∨
s′∈[d]
∧
s∈[d]
|xs(pi)− xs(v)| 6 |xs′(qj)− xs′(v)|,
By comparing the squared values instead of the absolute values, we have a formula which demonstrates
that even with the L∞ norm, the problem is contained in ∃∀R and there exists an algorithm of
complexity O((nck`d2)(kd+1)(`d+1)2k`d2) to solve it.
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Theorem 16. The one-round discrete Voronoi game 〈V, k, `〉 in Rd with the Lp norm is contained
in ∃∀R. Moreover, for fixed k, `, d there exists an algorithm that solves it in polynomial time.
De Berg et al. [9] introduced the notion of personalized preferences. More precisely, given a natural
number p, assuming each axis defines an aspect of the subject voters are voting for, the voter vi gives
different weights to different axes, and vi has a weighted Lp distance (
∑
j∈[d]wij(xj(p)− xj(vi))p)1/p
from any point p ∈ Rd. For the weighted L∞ distance, vi is at distance maxj∈[d](wij |xj(p)− xj(vi)|)
from any point p ∈ Rd. This approach also works when voters have personalized preferences.
5 Concluding remarks
We presented the first polynomial-time algorithm for the one-round discrete Voronoi game in R1.
The algorithm is quite intricate, and it would be interesting to see if a simpler (and perhaps also
faster) algorithm is possible. Finding a lower bound for the 1-dimensional case is another open
problem.
We also showed that the problem is ΣP2 -hard in R2. Fekete and Meijer [11] conjectured that
finding an optimal strategy for the multi-round continuous version of the Voronoi game is PSPACE-
complete. We conjecture that in the multi-round version of the discrete version, finding an optimal
strategy is PSPACE-hard as well. Note that using the algebraic method presented in this paper, it
is easy to show that this problem is contained in PSPACE. While the algebraic method we used is
considered a standard technique, it is, as far as we know, the first time this method is combined
with polynomial-size boolean formulas for the majority function. We think it should be possible to
apply this combination to other problems as well.
References
[1] Hee-Kap Ahn, Siu-Wing Cheng, Otfried Cheong, Mordecai Golin, and Rene Van Oostrum.
Competitive facility location: the voronoi game. Theoretical Computer Science, 310(1-3):457–467,
2004.
[2] Miklós Ajtai, János Komlós, and Endre Szemerédi. Sorting in c log n parallel steps. Combina-
torica, 3(1):1–19, 1983.
[3] Aritra Banik, Bhaswar B Bhattacharya, and Sandip Das. Optimal strategies for the one-round
discrete voronoi game on a line. Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, 26(4):655–669, 2013.
[4] Aritra Banik, Bhaswar B Bhattacharya, Sandip Das, and Sreeja Das. Two-round discrete
voronoi game along a line. In Frontiers in Algorithmics and Algorithmic Aspects in Information
and Management, pages 210–220. Springer, 2013.
[5] Aritra Banik, Bhaswar B Bhattacharya, Sandip Das, and Satyaki Mukherjee. The discrete
voronoi game in r2. Computational Geometry, 63:53–62, 2017.
[6] Aritra Banik, Jean-Lou De Carufel, Anil Maheshwari, and Michiel Smid. Discrete voronoi
games and epsilon-nets, in two and three dimensions. Computational Geometry, 55:41–58, 2016.
[7] Saugata Basu, Richard Pollack, and Marie-Françoise Roy. On the combinatorial and algebraic
complexity of quantifier elimination. Journal of the ACM, 43(6):1002–1045, 1996.
24
[8] Otfried Cheong, Sariel Har-Peled, Nathan Linial, and Jiří Matoušek. The one-round voronoi
game. Discrete & Computational Geometry, 31(1):125–138, 2004.
[9] Mark de Berg, Joachim Gudmundsson, and Mehran Mehr. Faster algorithms for computing
plurality points. ACM Transactions on Algorithms, 14(3):36:1–36:23, 2018.
[10] Michael G Dobbins, Linda Kleist, Tillmann Miltzow, and Paweł Rzążewski. ∀∃R-completeness
and area-universality. In Proceedings of the 44th International Graph-Theoretic Concepts in
Computer Science (WG 2018), pages 164–175, 2018.
[11] Sándor P Fekete and Henk Meijer. The one-round voronoi game replayed. Computational
Geometry, 30(2):81–94, 2005.
[12] David Lichtenstein. Planar formulas and their uses. SIAM Journal on Computing, 11(2):329–343,
1982.
[13] Wei-Yin Lin, Yen-Wei Wu, Hung-Lung Wang, and Kun-Mao Chao. Forming plurality at
minimum cost. In Proceedings of the 9th International Workshop on Algorithms and Computation,
pages 77–88, 2015.
[14] Richard D McKelvey and Richard E Wendell. Voting equilibria in multidimensional choice
spaces. Mathematics of operations research, 1(2):144–158, 1976.
[15] Michael Paterson and Uri Zwick. Shallow circuits and concise formulae for multiple addition
and multiplication. Computational Complexity, 3(3):262–291, 1993.
[16] Pierre Rosenstiehl and Robert E Tarjan. Rectilinear planar layouts and bipolar orientations of
planar graphs. Discrete & Computational Geometry, 1(4):343–353, 1986.
[17] Joachim Spoerhase and H-C Wirth. (r, p)-centroid problems on paths and trees. Theoretical
Computer Science, 410(47-49):5128–5137, 2009.
[18] Larry J Stockmeyer. The polynomial-time hierarchy. Theoretical Computer Science, 3(1):1–22,
1976.
[19] Sachio Teramoto, Erik D Demaine, and Ryuhei Uehara. The voronoi game on graphs and its
complexity. Journal of Graph Algorithms and Applications, 15(4):485–501, 2011.
[20] Yen-Wei Wu, Wei-Yin Lin, Hung-Lung Wang, and Kun-Mao Chao. Computing plurality
points and condorcet points in euclidean space. In International Symposium on Algorithms and
Computation, pages 688–698, 2013.
25
